

### **I. Executive Summary**

This report responds to a proviso in the 2011 Adopted Budget (Ordinance 16984, Section 48) regarding the Department of Adult and Juvenile Detention (DAJD). This is one of six provisos in DAJD's 2011 Adopted Budget. Of the six, three provisos (P1, P2 and P3) direct DAJD to study specific areas of its operations for potential cost reductions and efficiencies. Throughout the year, the department will be scrutinizing its operation, including engaging outside experts to assist in looking for ways to update and streamline department practices, particularly with regard to staffing, Intake Transfer and Release (ITR) and the inmate classification system.

Proviso P1 requires a status report on "operational changes that may result in cost savings as identified in operational master plans and in audit reports completed by the King County auditor." The proviso calls out three specific operational areas: 1) staffing alternatives at King County correctional facility (KCCF) and at the Maleng Regional Justice Center (MRJC); 2) third shift floor control at the KCCF; and 3) the ITR remodel at KCCF. To respond to the proviso, the department reviewed past recommendations and work related to the 2004 Operational Master Plan (OMP) as well as the 2010 King County Auditor report. Several work sessions were held with command and operations staff to review and assess options in the three focus areas.

The following represents the key findings and next steps for each area:

#### **Staffing Alternatives at KCCF and MRJC**

Some staffing recommendations made in the 2004 OMP have been implemented, including double bunking MRJC units to 180 percent of single-cell capacity and reconfiguring the first floor of the west wing at KCCF (see page 3 for further information). Recommendations for further review, and alternatives suggested by the 2010 County Auditor report, present options for potential cost savings. The department will explore these options in depth in response to proviso P3 related to staffing alternatives and finding "examples of the most cost effective staffing models." This more detailed review will allow for sufficient time to assess benefits, risks and issues associated with staffing concepts including reducing the number and proportion of staff directly supervising inmates and changing staffing models within the context of the increased complexity of the population.

#### **Third Shift Floor Control at KCCF<sup>1</sup>**

The 2004 OMP included a concept of shifting the operation of several of KCCF's floor controls to central control during third shift, so as to reduce staffing during the lower-activity night hours. With the completion of the Integrated Security Project (ISP) some, but not all, technology necessary to assess this recommendation was put in place. DAJD is currently moving to install additional security equipment that would be necessary for a complete test of the concept. After a full assessment is

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<sup>1</sup> In the OMP, this option was also referred to "Alternative Staffing of the KCCF after completion of the ISP. By reviewing Third Shift Floor Control, the department is simultaneously responding to proviso 1 direction to review "alternative staffing at the KCCF."

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complete, the department will work with the Facilities Management Division and Office of Performance Strategy and Budget staff to develop a cost benefit analysis.

### **ITR Remodel**

Many of the cost savings that were anticipated in the redesign of the KCCF ITR have been realized and captured in prior year budgets. However, ITR will continue to be a focus of DAJD's proviso work. Of the six provisos, three relate to ITR functions. On March 31, 2011, the department reported on its actions to maintain booking operations at the MRJC at a reduced level. This report covers the status of the ITR remodel at KCCF. The third response relating to ITR will report on an independent analysis of the ITR workload, which will identify workload components and map key processes for ITR at both of the county adult detention facilities.

### **II. Scope**

This report provides an update on the status of past operational master plan and audit recommendations outlined in the 2011 Adopted Budget proviso P1 which states:

*Of this appropriation, \$1,500,000 shall not be expended or encumbered until the executive transmits and the council adopts a motion that references the proviso's ordinance, section and number and states that the executive has responded to the proviso.*

*This proviso requires the department of adult and juvenile detention to review and report on operational changes that may result in cost savings as identified in operational master plans and in audit reports completed by the King County auditor. This review should include a report on the status of operational master plan study recommendations and the department's efforts to implement recommendations from the county auditor. Specifically, the review should: (1) examine staffing alternatives that might reduce costs at the King County correctional facility and at the Norm Maleng regional justice center, such as changes to the county's current policies for staffing "double bunking." This examination should review alternative staffing-to-inmate ratios while considering the daily volatility and complexity of the population. The review should concentrate on alternative staffing plans and inmate mixes that lead to the lowest staff--to-inmate ratios and any other changes that result in lower costs; (2) update the status of recommendations related to third shift floor control at the King County correctional facility, and any other recommendations stemming from the improvements made during the integrated security project and other capital improvements to date. The department should also consider options for greater*

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*use of video supervision in lieu of staff-only supervision for specialized populations; and (3) examine models for Intake/Transfer/Release Remodel and review previous recommendations for efficiencies in this area.*

*The executive must transmit to the council the motion and report by April 28, 2011, filed in the form of a paper original and an electronic copy with the clerk of the council, who shall retain the original and provide an electronic copy to all council members, the council chief of staff and the lead staff for the law, justice, health and human services committee and the budget and fiscal management committee or their successors.*

### **III. Background**

The Adult Detention Operational Master Plan (OMP) was approved by the Metropolitan King County Council in 2004 and subsequently updated in 2005 with an evaluation and implementation plan. The OMP listed options for improving the efficiency of DAJD operations. Key findings include:

- “DAJD currently operates within commonly accepted correctional practices and has made changes in recent years to improve the efficiency of its operations.
- There are a number of promising options that together have the potential for significant cost savings in the DAJD operations. Some options represent major shifts in the way the county jails are operated and will require testing, evaluation, refinement, and gradual implementation.”<sup>2</sup>

Since the delivery of this report in 2004, DAJD has spent extensive staff time and resources in the evaluation of the feasibility and effectiveness of the options and has implemented some of the recommendations including:

#### **Double Bunk RJC Units to 180 Percent of Single Cell Capacity<sup>3</sup>**

The proposal to increase the double bunking percentage from 165 percent to 180 percent was implemented in the 2004 budget and the savings fully incorporated in DAJD’s subsequent budgets. This moved the number of inmates in a double-bunked housing unit from 106 to 115, or nine additional inmates per housing unit.

#### **ITR Remodel<sup>4</sup>**

The impact of this implementation is discussed in detail below.

#### **Changes to the First Floor of the West Wing of the KCCF<sup>5</sup>**

Inmate housing of 44 women was removed from the first floor of the KCCF West Wing and the beds distributed to the second, third and fourth floors of the West Wing,

<sup>2</sup> Adult Detention Operational Master Plan, C. Murray, et al. 2004, p. 2

<sup>3</sup> Adult Detention Operational Master Plan, C. Murray, et al. 2004, p. 105

<sup>4</sup> Adult Detention Operational Master Plan, C. Murray, et al. 2004, p. 105

<sup>5</sup> Adult Detention Operational Master Plan”, C. Murray, et al. 2004, p. 106

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maintaining the total capacity of 435 secure beds in the West Wing. Personnel reductions associated with this bed removal was recognized in the 2005 budget.

Some initial options were found to be unfeasible at the time, such as the replacement of the KCCF and the expansion of the MRJC. Other concepts, including replacement of the third shift floor control or the addition of video visitation, could only be tested and evaluated after the completion of the ISP, which was completed in 2010.

This report discusses the current status of three options for increased efficiency addressed in the Operational Master Plan and in the 2010 County Auditor report:

- 1) staffing alternatives at MRJC
- 2) third shift floor control at KCCF
- 3) ITR remodel.

### **IV. Option Review**

This section reviews each of the three options and provides the following:

- A. description of options from source documents
- B. background and context for each
- C. an update on progress and review
- D. next steps, if any.

#### **Option 1: Staffing Alternatives at MRJC**

A. **Description of Option.** In 2004, the OMP recommended that DAJD review the policy of adding relief officers when housing units are double bunked at the MRJC. During that time, the inmate population was increasing and DAJD's adult secure housing population was large enough to require double bunk housing units because all single-bunked capacity was utilized. The relief officer policy adds an additional housing officer on first and second shift when inmates are double celled, and an additional rover, or response officer, for each three double-bunked unit, starting with the first unit double celled. This is to ensure the safety of both inmates and officers. As such, the OMP focus was on the number of officers needed in the housing unit when double bunked (changing the threshold to add a second housing officer) and when additional activity officers are needed.

In 2010, the King County Auditor looked at potential revisions of MRJC staffing when the facility houses a low level of population, *below* the MRJC's single-bunked capacity. The Auditor suggested that DAJD could produce cost savings when populations are low in three potential ways: 1) increase the number of inmates in each housing unit with the same staffing level, 2) reduce the number of staff for the same inmate population, or 3) consolidate units through double bunking while reducing staff.

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The Auditor suggested that by using the alternative staffing arrangements described above, additional housing units could be closed, reducing costs by \$0.6 million to \$1.7 million per year. This estimate was based on 2009 data and did not factor in the two housing units that were closed in 2010 and remain closed. This closure of two housing units, in response to lower inmate populations, reduced operating costs by \$1.3 million per year, which was captured in the 2010 budget.

**B. Background.** The MRJC is a direct supervision facility. In direct supervision facilities, corrections officers have non-barrier, face-to-face contact with inmates.<sup>6</sup>

- **The housing unit design is podular.** Inmates' cells are arranged around a common area, usually called a dayroom. There is no secure control booth for the supervising officer, and there are no physical barriers between the officer and the inmates.
- **The inmate management style is direct supervision.** An officer is stationed in the pod with the inmates throughout the officer's duty shift. The officer moves about the pod and interacts with the inmates to manage their behavior.

MRJC housing units have 64 cells around a dayroom, with an outdoor recreation area directly attached to each housing unit. There are 11 general population units, one close custody (higher security) unit, a medical unit and an administrative segregation unit in the facility. The medical unit and administrative segregation units are physically separated into an east wing and a west wing. Because of this physical separation, these units are staffed separately in each wing.

The classification of housing units affects the optimum housing of the facility. The classification of each unit varies depending on the security level of inmates at any given point in time. The following table provides a snapshot of the current classification of MRJC housing units.

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<sup>6</sup> Additionally, the U.S. Department of Justice – National Institute of Corrections (DOJ – NIC) Jails Division provides more information regarding direct supervision housing unit at <http://nicic.gov/Downloads/PDF/Library/021968.pdf>

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**Table 1: Recent MRJC Housing Unit Configuration**

Housing Unit	Gender	Classification	Program
D	Male	Close	
E	Male	Medium	
F	Male	Minimum	
G	Male	EMPTY	
H	Male	EMPTY	
J	Male	Medium	
K	Male	Minimum	Inmate Worker
L	Male	Minimum	Transitional Recovery
M east	Male	Receiving	Psych/Med
M west	Male	Psych/Med	Mixed Gender
N east	Male	Admin Seg	Discipline
N west	Female	Close/Med	Ad/Seg, Discip
P	Female	Minimum	
Q	Male	Medium	
R	Male	Medium	
S	Male	Minimum	Inmate Worker

**Definitions**

**Inmate Worker:** "Trustees" - inmates who perform work that would otherwise be done by paid employees.

**Transitional Recovery Program:** In custody alcohol and drug treatment program funded by Drug Court and Mental Health Court (MIDD)

**Psych/Med:** Inmates with lower acuity psychiatric and medical issues. Usually awaiting transport back to Seattle

**Ad/Seg:** Administrative Segregation. Inmates moved to more secure housing pending infraction hearings, in protective custody, or otherwise not appropriate for general pop.

**Discipline:** Inmates found to have committed infractions and sentenced to punishment housing

MRJC housing units were originally designed for one inmate per cell. However, the County has installed additional bunks to most housing units allowing DAJD to house two inmates in a cell, up to a maximum of 115 inmates per unit, or 180 percent of single bunked capacity. As a safety and security issue, certain units, such as the close custody and administrative segregation units, are not double bunked. The table below illustrates the distinctions between King County Adult Detention classifications:

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### Table 2: Custody Classification Levels

Classification	Description
Minimum	Inmates are typically cooperative, with misdemeanor, felony property or drug offenses; sentenced to jail on other offenses with minimal felony criminal history of crimes against persons; and little to no prison incarceration experience
Medium	Inmates are generally cooperative, with non-serious or infrequent minor disciplinary violations AND Charged awaiting trial on a felony property or drug offense with a criminal history of felony convictions of crimes against person; OR Charged awaiting trial on a felony crime against a person (except homicide) and no known history of convictions on crimes against a person; or if prison experience, conviction was on a property or drug offense; OR Demonstrate verbal aggression and minor rule violation
Close	Inmates have serious criminal justice factors, e.g. charged with crimes against persons, significant prison experience and significant criminal history, and may be held on a serious hold for another jurisdiction and/or have demonstrated significant behavior problems and aggression
Maximum	Inmates are in an individual housing cell with separation from other inmates due to ongoing physical aggression, and/or escape or attempt to escape from DAJD custody; and/or facing death penalty on charges; and/or extreme safety and security risks; terrorist types of acts; and/or extremely serious criminal or behavior actions requiring separation from all other inmates. Extreme cases are designated Ultra Security

MRJC housing units are generally organized around these classifications. In keeping with the direct supervision concept of behavior management, inmates are rewarded with additional privileges for good behavior and are placed in more restrictive settings for bad behavior. Additional housing considerations include gender, programming needs and employment as inmate workers. Inmates with serious medical or psychiatric needs and inmates in the highest security classifications are not housed at the MRJC. Those inmates are exclusively housed at KCCF. Other factors that contribute to inmate housing facility assignment include court case assignment area and the availability of the required housing type.

**Current Staffing Policies are based on Direct Supervision Design and Industry Standards.** When single-bunked, MRJC housing units are staffed by one officer for up to 64 inmates in a general population housing unit during all shifts. Officers may not leave the housing unit if inmates are out in the dayroom or outdoor recreation areas. If inmates are confined to their cells, officers may leave the unit for short time periods for activities such as lunch, training and emergency responses. During such times, the

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intercom from the inmate's cell is connected to housing control or to the facility central control.

When double-bunked, MRJC housing units are staffed by two officers on first shift (6:30 AM to 2:30 PM) and second shift (2:30 PM to 10:30 PM), and one officer on third shift (10:30 PM to 6:30 AM). In a double-bunking situation, at least one officer must be present in the unit at all times. Further, inmates must be in their cells if only one officer is in the unit. The threshold for adding an additional officer is the 65<sup>th</sup> inmate in the housing unit. The rationale for adding staff is that while inmates are single bunked, there is very little chance of inmate-on-inmate violence. However, when a second inmate is added to the cell, the opportunity for an inmate-on-inmate assault within the cell arises.

In addition to the housing unit officers, there are also a number of activity officers assigned to each shift. Activity officers provide escorts for inmates moving within the facility, serve as the first level of response to any urgent or emergency situation in the facility (codes), supervise the distribution of inmate meals, provide relief for housing unit officers' breaks and perform many other tasks. There are four activity officers on first and second shifts and three on third shift.

When the first single-bunked unit in the facility is double bunked, an additional activity officer is added due to the increased inmate population. A further officer is added for every three double-bunked units. Because of this additional activity officer staffing, double bunking is not necessarily more efficient than single bunking. As the inmate population increases, staffing also increases in a proportionate amount to maintain the safety and security of staff and inmates. The efficiency of double bunking is also driven by classification mix. The daily volatility of the population can affect the optimum use of a housing unit.

Effective supervision is a dynamic process the unit officer employs to manage inmate behavior, based on generally accepted behavior management techniques. It closely relates to effective control and specifically refers to the interaction between the unit officer and the inmate. In the 2004 report, the OMP consultants discussed the linkage between direct supervision and inmate behavior management at length:

"The officers are in constant and direct contact with the inmates which allows them to get to know the inmates and recognize and respond to trouble before it escalates into violence. Inmates, as well as staff, are placed in an environment that reduces stress and promotes safety. Any revision to policy that reduces the amount of out-of-cell time represents a compromise of the objectives of the direct supervision model over current DAJD practice.

Double celling in and of itself, increases risks to inmates and staff. The workload created by adding up to 51 additional inmates to a unit with 64 existing inmates and cells is greater than simply having 51 more inmates to supervise. When cells have more than one occupant, officers must also supervise situations that can develop inside the cells that do not occur when a cell has a single occupant."

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In the opinion of the OMP consultant team, DAJD's current practice of adding an additional activity officer when units at the RJC are double celled "is a reasonable and defensible practice; although further study might identify other ways to accomplish the same objective."<sup>7</sup>

The OMP consultants recommended a further review of the duties performed by relief officers to help establish a baseline for determining how many relief/escort officers are needed at various population levels at the MRJC.<sup>8</sup> The consultant recommended that this issue be explored further through staffing model development and should be related to "various security levels as well as the physical design of each jail."<sup>9</sup>

DAJD's policy for double bunking is consistent with other jurisdictions and industry best practice. The OMP included a review of approximately 50 comparable facilities around the country. Based on this review, the OMP consultant team concluded that "a decision by DAJD to increase double celling [bunking] at the RJC from 165 percent of single cell capacity to 180 percent is fairly aggressive but within the range of good correctional practice." This review also concluded that "the department's policy to add another housing unit officer when the unit is doubled is a reasonable and defensible practice."<sup>10</sup>

**C. Progress to Date and Review.** DAJD has implemented aspects of the OMP recommendations with regard to MRJC staffing. As discussed above, the proposal to move the double-bunking percentage from 165 percent to 180 percent was implemented in the 2004 budget and the savings fully incorporated in DAJD's budgets, which assume double-bunking. In addition, since 2008, the department has incorporated parameters within its operations forecasting model (OFM) to determine its officer staffing level requirement under various capacity utilization plans. These parameter values define the following: 1) housing areas to be opened or closed; 2) the staffing model per housing area and relief-level adjustments required for housing area utilization levels; and 3) evaluation of changes in utilization plan levels by month.

In recent years, jail population has declined substantially. However, the complexity of the population has increased. For example, in 2007 the proportion of minimum security inmates in DAJD custody (both KCCF and MRJC) was higher (52 percent) than medium and close security inmates (48 percent). That split has shifted in the opposite direction and today 47 percent of inmates are minimum classification and 53 percent are medium or close security. The percent of maximum security inmates has increased as the total population has declined. The following table illustrates the shift in classification mix at the MRJC from 2007 to 2010.

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<sup>7</sup> Adult Detention Operational Master Plan, Chris Murray and Associates, 2004, p115.

<sup>8</sup> Adult Detention Operational Master Plan, Chris Murray and Associates, 2004, p. 11.

<sup>9</sup> "Adult Detention Operational Master Plan", C. Murray, et al. 2004, p. 198

<sup>10</sup> Integrated Security Project Implementation Plan Report, Chris Murray and Associates, 2004, p. 2

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**Table 3: From 2007 to 2010 MRJC Classification Complexity Increased**

	2007	2010
Minimum	541 ADP (48.1%)	273 ADP (41.3%)
Medium	469 ADP (41.8%)	278 ADP (41.9%)
Close/Maximum	107 ADP (9.6%)	107 ADP (16.1%)

Higher classification inmates increase the intensity of officers' inmate supervisory responsibilities. Consolidation of inmates with higher classification increases the inherent risk of incidents. This risk is one of the reasons for the increase in unit officer and activity officer staffing when units are double bunked. Inmate management becomes more staff-intensive as security classifications increase.<sup>11</sup> The attached Appendix A, "Inmate Management by Classification," illustrates the complexity of various security levels. Additionally, as the population becomes more concentrated with close/maximum security inmates, the number of incidences of "keep separates," requirements to maintain separation between specific inmates for security reasons, increases. This is often due to inmates' past criminal behavior, gang affiliation, familiarity with incarceration. For example, inmates with rival gang affiliations are flagged for separate housing units in order to reduce the risk of inmate-on-inmate violence.

### **County Auditor Suggestion No. 1 -- Increase the Number of Inmates at MRJC**

The County Auditor suggested that by moving more inmates from Seattle to Kent, the average cost per inmate in the MRJC would decrease and that a corresponding reduction in the population at KCCF would also drive savings rather than simply redistributing costs.

In order to reduce costs in this way, a sufficient number of inmates of the right gender and classification would need to be moved from KCCF, with a corresponding housing unit at KCCF closed entirely. As described above, the balancing of inmate housing between facilities is quite complex. It involves the sometimes competing needs of the courts and the need for appropriate housing types and for inmate workers in both facilities.

Several important issues regarding this suggestion need to be further explored. These issues include potential mismatches between court case assignment area and housing location, the potential increase of inter-facility transportation to court (which increases costs), and whether a sufficient number of inmates with similar classifications can be consolidated between the two facilities.

### **County Auditor Suggestion No. 2 -- Reduce the Number of Staff for the Same Inmate Population**

This suggestion examined increasing the number of inmates within a housing unit from 64 to 80, thus double bunking some cells and closing other housing units through consolidation into fewer units. The opportunity for such a consolidation is largely affected by the classification mix and special needs population at the facility. The level

<sup>11</sup> "Adult Detention Operational Master Plan", C. Murray, et al. 2004, Appendix, p. 32

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of savings from this operational change would be in part derived from staffing savings at KCCF, with the same corresponding challenges as discussed above. This alternative is further complicated by double bunking a portion of the cells within the unit without additional supervision. This poses logistical challenges of housing assignment and behavior management that require further analysis. These issues are discussed further in suggestion no. 3 below. The concept of using a one-officer-to-80 inmate ratio is a divergent practice from the design and policies of the MRJC facility and will need additional evaluation. Moreover, the concept is also not aligned with best practice:

“The collective experience with staffing ratios during the past 25 years is that one officer can effectively supervise 64 inmates and under special circumstances can effectively supervise 72. An additional finding is that one officer supervising 64 inmates is more effective than two officers supervising 100 inmates. Many variables affect the effective ratio of unit officers to inmates, such as: the inmates’ classification, the housing unit design, the officer’s supervision skills, and the types of activities in the unit. Because of this, setting one ratio for all applications is unrealistic.”<sup>12</sup>

**County Auditor Suggestion No. 3 -- Consolidate Units through Double Bunking While Reducing Staff**

The Auditor’s report suggested that currently single-bunked units could be compressed into double-bunked units, allowing the closure of additional housing units. Because the total number of inmates housed in the facility has not increased, there would be no need to add additional activity officers. Cost savings are assumed from staffing reductions on third shift, when only one officer is needed to supervise the housing unit, rather than the two officers on first and second shift.

Based on the current population housing mix at the MRJC, it is unlikely that the facility can match the Auditor’s estimate in daily operation. The projected savings assume that ten housing units can be compressed into five units, saving five housing unit posts on third shift. This unfortunately does not match the current housing configuration.

The MRJC has eleven general population housing units. Beginning in January 2010 and continuing in 2011, two of these are closed, one is dedicated to female minimum security inmates and cannot legally be combined with another unit, four are medium security and four are minimum security. The four medium security units are close enough to capacity that the consolidated population would move from four single-bunked units to two double-bunked units and one single-bunked unit. The four minimum security units are less close to capacity and therefore could potentially be consolidated into two double-bunked units. However, they present a different set of difficulties. Two of the minimum security units house inmate workers, who work in the facility by cleaning and assisting in the kitchen and laundry. Double bunking these inmates can be problematic due to different work schedules (for example, the morning kitchen workers start at 3:00 AM). Additionally, the Transitional Recovery Program (TRP), a certified substance abuse

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<sup>12</sup> Self-Audit Instrument for Administrators of Direct Supervision Jails Based on the Measurable Elements of Direct Supervision, NIC, 2004

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treatment program, is housed in one of the remaining minimum security units. In the past, State Department Health and Human Services program staff expressed concerns with housing non-participants in the same housing unit as TRP participants.

In a double-bunked environment, one officer must be present in the housing unit at all times. Under the suggested scenario, there would be a reduction of up to four officers who would not be available to respond to medical or security emergencies throughout the facility. This staffing reduction may open the County to possible litigation and labor issues. Based on the current classification mix, by reducing the number of staff on third shift, the department may be able to consolidate between two and four housing units. The potential cost savings is a reduction of \$0.2 million to \$0.4 million per year. However, as stated above, this potential cost savings may be accompanied by additional risk to facility safety.

D. **Next Steps.** Recommendations for further review, and alternatives suggested by the 2010 County Auditor report, presents options with potential cost savings. The department will explore these options in depth in response to proviso P2 that relates to staffing alternatives and finding “examples of the most cost effective staffing models.” In conjunction with proviso P2, the department has requested that the National Institute of Corrections (NIC) review these issues through its technical assistance program. The initial review is expected to occur in the next few months and will include the classification complexity, behavior management objectives, and safety and security considerations outlined in this report. Once viable alternatives are identified and fully vetted, the department will use the OMP Evaluation and Implementation Methodology to test and evaluate the options. This methodology is attached as Appendix B: Evaluation and Implementation Plan Methodology.<sup>13</sup>

This more detailed review will allow for sufficient time to assess benefits, risks and issues associated with staffing concepts that include reducing the number and proportion of staff directly supervising inmates and changing staffing models within the context of the increased complexity of the population.

### **Option 2: Third Shift Floor Control at KCCF**

A. **Description of Option.** The OMP recommended:

“Turn over Floor Control communication and control functions to Central Control on the third shift. Continue to operate the tower with the same staffing as has historically been used on the first and second shift.

The OMP team believes that, with post-ISP technology, two officers in Central Control will be able to handle these contingencies. If experience proves otherwise, it might be necessary to add a third Central Control Room officer on the night shift.”

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<sup>13</sup> Adult Detention and Operational Master Plan Evaluation and Implementation Plan, DAJD, 2005, pg 11.

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The Integrated Security Project will replace the security electronic systems with modern communication and control systems. Among other things, the ISP will give Central Control the ability to perform the communication and control functions that up to now only Floor control could do.”<sup>14</sup>

**B. Background.** The KCCF complex includes a tower. Each floor in the tower has an independent floor control post that is responsible for the following on that floor:

- Opening doors into each housing unit and other areas of the floor,
- Monitoring the cameras that provide views of obscured corners of the recreation yards and multi-purpose rooms,
- Coordinating and directing correctional officers responding to codes,
- Visually monitoring the housing unit officers.

The OMP estimated that posts associated with control on five floors of the KCCF tower could be eliminated once ISP was fully implemented. A maximum of one post might be shifted from floor control to central control to accommodate the potential increased complexity of centrally monitoring five floors. If feasible, consolidating floor control to central control during third shift could result in the reduction of four or five posts for a potential annual cost reduction of \$0.7 million to \$0.9 million per year.

The OMP also envisioned additional technology to improve the safety and security of the areas through duress alarms and improved camera sightlines:

“Since this proposal would eliminate the one person who can see the wing officers and call a code if the officer is in trouble, officers at KCCF should be provided with duress alarms. Duress alarms are used at the RJC where the officer in a single celled unit is never routinely observed by another officer. At KCCF the new security electronics could be programmed to activate a pan-tilt camera to scan the unit when a duress alarm is activated.”<sup>15</sup>

**C. Progress to Date and Review.** The OMP assumed camera placement and remote visual capability that was not part of the ISP work completed at KCCF in 2010. The ISP provided central control with the ability to perform communication and control functions that previously could only be performed by individual floor controls. However, the cameras and duress alarms discussed in the OMP were not within the scope of ISP. The scope of this portion of the project was scaled back in order to reduce costs.

A further security enhancement at KCCF, unrelated to ISP, was the Security Camera Project initiated in 2008. The scope of this project was to install a recordable camera system in selected areas in the DAJD facilities where staff and juveniles/inmates have contact. Due to limited capital funds, the original request of \$5.5 million was reduced to phased installation approach. Phase I received \$1.9 million in funding and Phase II,

<sup>14</sup>“Adult Detention Operational Master Plan”, C. Murray, et al. 2004, p. 132-138.

<sup>15</sup>“Adult Detention Operational Master Plan”, C. Murray, et al. 2004, p. 137

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which would have provided a full array of cameras at the both the adult and juvenile facilities (initially estimated at \$5.2 million), was not funded.

To fully implement the OMP recommendations, additional capital enhancements to KCCF would be necessary to eliminate existing blind spots in central control's camera viewing area on each floor. While the full cost of the enhancements is not yet known, the capital outlay could result in longer term operational savings. For example, an initial capital investment of \$4 million could be recouped within five to six years and provide continuing savings to the County of \$0.7 million to \$0.9 million per year in today's dollars by consolidating 3<sup>rd</sup> Shift floor control posts to central control at the KCCF.

**D. Next Steps.** In order to undertake a safe and adequate test of the consolidation of floor controls, the department is currently upgrading several of the video monitors in central control to provide clear images of the various floors. After installation is complete (estimated spring 2011), the facility will conduct a simulation where floor control functions will be handed off to central control (estimated Summer of 2011).

During this evaluation, DAJD will assess whether Central Control has the ability to:

- Open and close doors on each floor.
- Effectively observe all areas on each of the floors.
- Effectively communicate with the housing unit officers and the inmates in their cells or dormitories.

In addition, testing will include hypothetical emergency events to ensure adequate response and coverage.

Several important safety and security issues will be evaluated including:

- length of time to respond to an emergency event in a housing unit when floor controls are vacated
- length of time to respond to an officer needing assistance in a common area in an emergency
- length of time for central control to respond to emergent movement and communication issues with additional floor control functions added
- length of time for central control to respond to routine movement and communication issues with the additional floor control functions added.

In testing and evaluating this recommendation, DAJD will use the methodology outlined in the OMP (see Appendix B). Once testing is performed, the department will work with the Facilities Management Division and Performance Strategy and Budget staff to develop a cost benefit analysis.

### **Option 3: ITR Remodel at KCCF**

**PROVISO RESPONSE -- OMP OPTIONS**

**A. Description of Option.** The OMP recommended redesign of the Jail Health Services (JHS) work area in ITR to allow for additional interaction by JHS at the front end of an individual's incarceration. While attempting to provide improved workflow and medical screening areas for JHS, other potential efficiencies within ITR were identified. The County expanded the scope of the ITR remodel as part of ISP to improve visibility and safety and to accommodate process changes that had occurred over the years since the facility was built. The OMP proposed that:

“At minimum, the need for one 24 hour, seven-day-a-week correctional officer position and one five day eight hour corrections post is eliminated by this remodel. The former is the post known as ITR control, a small control room that operates several doors and monitors cameras located on the floor. Through the ISP project and the proposed remodel, this function is transferred to the new Central control room on the fifth floor. Consolidation of functions made possible by physical changes eliminates the need for corrections technician post to one.”<sup>16</sup>

**B. Background and C. Progress to Date.** Between August 2005 and July 2006, the third floor ITR area was closed for remodeling. During that time, several improvements were made including:

- Staff work areas were consolidated in one area.
- Physical layout redesigned to accommodate updated workflow.
- A policy change required the dress out of new bookings into jail uniforms during initial processing.
- Holding areas were redesigned to accommodate individual street-booking arrests and smaller group bookings from local precincts.
- Property room and cashier area were combined.
- Additional JHS exam rooms and medical workstations were added to complete inmate assessment and enter electronic medical records.
- Management of movement and visual oversight shifted to central control and was consolidated with their other movement controls.

The changes made to ITR through the OMP and ISP improved the workflow of health screening, inmate processing, law enforcement access and security. The redesign allowed for the elimination of the floor control post providing a cost reduction of \$0.2 million per year, as well as reducing the total number of corrections officers assigned to ITR each shift.

The OMP's recommendation has been fully implemented with a total reduction of 6 FTEs in the 2005, 2006 and 2007 budget. The department realized one additional corrections officer FTE reduction over the OMP recommendation. However, the department found that it needed a corrections technician post specifically dedicated to

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<sup>16</sup> “Adult Detention Operational Master Plan”, C. Murray, et al. 2004, p. 116

## PROVISO RESPONSE -- OMP OPTIONS

cashiering duties and, therefore, did not realize the reduction of a full corrections technician post when the department combined the property storage room and the jail cashier area. This efficiency resulted in a corrections technician reduction of 0.2 FTE in the 2005 budget.

D. **Next Steps.** The ITR remodel fully met the OMP expectation, and an improvement in internal workload was realized. No further benefits are expected to be realized from this recommendation. Additional analysis of other aspects of ITR will be performed through Proviso 3, which, in conjunction with the NIC, will explore best practices and potential efficiencies.

### **V. Conclusion**

As noted above, DAJD has commenced a work program that will continue through the year to look at these and other issues identified in the Council provisos to DAJD's 2011 budget. The department has engaged expert assistance through the National Institute of Corrections, who will review many aspects of DAJD's operation during 2011, as set out in the provisos, and make recommendations. This work will include several of the issue areas outlined in this report including classification, the increased complexity of the jail population, and the safety and security of the facilities. DAJD looks forward to reporting on the progress of those studies as part of its remaining proviso responses through 2011.

Additional upcoming proviso responses include:

- Proviso 2 – Best Practices (due September 2011). Engage the services of a nationally recognized expert or group to provide technical assistance and prepare a report that evaluates alternatives & national models including, cost effective staffing models, review the classification system, options for reducing costs, and jail contracting/fee setting.
- Proviso 3 – Review of Intake Transfer and Release (due June 2011). Identify business process improvements that will streamline ITR operations to reduce duplication, increase efficiencies, and improve alignment of current operations with national best practices.

# Appendix A

## JOB FUNCTION: INMATE MANAGEMENT

JOB TASK	MINIMUM	MEDIUM	CLOSE/MAX	RESTRICTED HOUSING
SUPERVISION OF INMATE WORKERS	Frequent staff supervision and presence.	Frequent supervision by assigned work supervisor with intermittent supervision and presence by Custody staff.	Direct supervision by assigned work supervisor with frequent supervision and presence by Custody staff.	Not normally assigned to work details, if assigned then direct Custody staff supervision is required w/visual observation of activity from a secure location.
SUPERVISION DURING RECREATIONAL ACTIVITIES	Frequent staff supervision and presence or intermittent supervision by Custody staff.	Frequent visual supervision by Custody staff with emergency response capability.	Direct and constant Custody supervision from both vicinity and secure location with emergency response capability.	Direct visual Custody supervision from secure area with emergency response capability.
SUPERVISION AT MEALS	Staff presence	Custody staff supervision and presence with emergency response capability	Visual Custody staff supervision from both vicinity and secure location with emergency response capability.	Deliveries by Custody staff to cell front under direct supervision from a secure area.
SUPERVISE NON-CONTACT VISITING	Intermittent visual monitoring by Custody staff or by electronic means.	Frequent visual monitoring by Custody staff or by electronic means.	Same as Medium	Same as Close/Max
SUPERVISE ON-SITE MEDICAL, INFIRMARY ACTIVITIES	Staff observation as required or directed by medical staff	Frequent visual supervision by assigned staff with emergency response capability.	Constant supervision by assigned staff visually or by video when outside of secure cell/room with emergency response capability.	Direct visual supervision from a secure location with emergency response capability.
CONDUCT OFF-GROUNDS HOSPITAL WATCH	Staff supervision and presence.	Staff supervision and presence. Normally one Custody staff utilizing restraints as indicated.	Same as Medium	Staff supervision and presence. Restraints in all cases. Up to two Custody staff as indicated.

# Appendix B

## **Testing and Evaluation Methodology**

The testing and evaluation of each option will depend on the complexity of the option and its potential impact on safety and security. In general, each option will follow four steps:

### Step 1 – Review

As noted in the OMP, DAJD has undergone significant changes in management. DAJD will review each option carefully to determine how it fits with the current County priorities and policies. Moreover, operational, labor, Hammer, and other policy issues will be identified and reviewed. DAJD may also propose alternative ways to accomplish the option. Based on this review, DAJD will bring the results (alternatives and policy issues) to the OMP Evaluation and Implementation Advisory Group and establish next steps for the testing the option. Specifically, project teams will be convened and guided by well-defined team charters.

### Step 2 – Testing

Several options involve significant changes to security staffing and operations. The OMP notes that these options may require testing in the field before determining their feasibility. Testing allows staff to carefully plan and prepare for an option on a limited scale. The process entails reviewing the responsibilities of each post in the affected area, revising policies and post orders, purchasing and installing equipment (if necessary), training staff, and ensuring that inmate services are maintained (medical, food, court, programs, visiting, commissary, etc.). Testing also requires sufficient time for staff to gain proficiency with the changes. It is also expected that this experience may lead to refinements of the option or other alternatives. For some options, outside consultants will provide assistance.

### Step 3 – Evaluation

Where applicable, each option will be evaluated against criteria reviewed by the OMP Evaluation and Implementation Advisory Group. DAJD will propose the criteria for each option, the associated measures, and the methodology for collecting the data. The more complex options may require assistance from an outside consultant. This step also involves estimating the cost and benefits of the option. DAJD will coordinate with the advisory group on using a consistent methodology for analyzing cost and benefits.

### Step 4 – Results/Next Steps

The results of the testing and evaluation will be reported to the OMP Evaluation and Implementation Advisory Group. If the option is viable and cost-effective, DAJD will develop a full-scale implementation plan that includes policies/procedures, final post orders, additional equipment purchase and installation, coordination with inmate services, full-scale training, and budget resources.

These four steps provide a sound, general approach for testing and evaluation. However, the actual testing and evaluation approach for each option will be customized depending on the level of complexity and the potential impact to security operations.